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Abstract
Institutional corruption in the health care sector has gained considerable attention during recent years, as it
acknowledges the fact that service providers who are acting in accordance with the institutional and environmental
settings can nevertheless undermine a health care system’s purposes as a result of the (financial) conflicts of interest
to which the service providers are exposed. The present analysis aims to contribute to the examination of institutional
corruption in the health sector by analyzing whether the current payment mechanism of separately remunerating
salaried hospital physicians for treating supplementary insured patients in public hospitals, in combination with
the public hospital physician’s possibility of taking up dual practice as a self-employed physician with a private
practice and/or as an attending physician in private hospitals, has the potential to undermine the primary
purposes of the Austrian public health care system. Based on the analysis of the institutional design of the
Austrian public hospital sector, legal provisions and directives have been identified, which have the potential to promote
conduct on the part of the public hospital physician that systematically undermines the achievement of the
Austrian public health system’s primary purposes.
Background
Analyses regarding the interplay between hospitals’ and
physicians’ financial incentives and the quantity and
quality of health care supply and expenditure have a
long history. The relevant contributions can be divided
broadly into two major streams: first there are those that
concentrate on the direct link between different payment
systems and service provision in terms of the volume
and range of services, technology use and service quality,
and second there are contributions that choose a
broader perspective by taking into account the conflicts
of interest that the service providers face in light of the
legal and institutional settings.
The impact that conflicts of interest may exert on the
conduct of health care professionals has been investi-
gated in the medical literature since the 1980s [1],
followed by an intensive examination by social scientists,
(health) economists, lawyers and ethicists. According to
Rodwin [2], p. 9, physicians are confronted with conflicts
of interest whenever ‘[…] their interests […] compromise
their independent judgment […].’ Thompson [3], p. 137,
clarified a conflict of interest as ‘[…] a set of circumstances
that are reasonably believed to create a substantial risk
that professional judgment of a primary interest will be
unduly influenced by a secondary interest.’ There is a
broad consensus that the primary interest of physicians
should be to act in the best interests of the patient, par-
ticularly as the relationship between physician and patient
is often considered to be fiduciary [4]. Physicians’
secondary interests comprise, among others, profes-
sional or scientific recognition, continuing professional
education and specialization, as well as financial gain.
Koelewijn et al. [5] investigated various personal interests
of hospital physicians in the Netherlands, which ranged
from helping patients as well as possible – supposedly the
primary interest – to having a say in work and to earning
a good income. Among the ten major interests under in-
vestigation, helping patients in the best possible way
ranked first while earning a good income was the fifth
most important interest. Jegers et al. [6] analyzed remu-
neration per service (so-called fee-for-service, FFS), per
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day, per case (diagnoses-related group, DRG), per patient
(capitation) and per period (global budget) and concluded
that service providers do indeed respond to financial
incentives, so – depending on the type of financial
incentive – effects on the volume, range, frequency
and continuity of services, number of hospitalizations,
length of stay (LOS) and (self-) referrals can be
observed. Similar results can be found in the relevant
literature [7–16], also considering the effects on quality
and risk selection [17–20].
The broader literature stream that problematizes the
fact that a physician who is acting in accordance with the
legal and institutional settings can nevertheless undermine
a system’s purposes as a result of the (financial) conflicts
of interest to which he or she is exposed dates back to the
early work on congressional ethics by Thompson, who
identified conduct on behalf of congressional members,
which ‘[…] under certain conditions is a necessary or even
desirable part of institutional duties […]’ and ‘[…] has a
tendency to damage the legislature of the democratic
process’ [21], p. 7. More generally speaking, this
phenomenon describes a situation in which the institu-
tional setting produces incentives that create conflicts of
interest and subsequently promote behavior on the part of
those who perform the duties within the institution that
systemically compromises the institution’s purposes.
Thompson [21] termed this phenomenon institutional
corruption. Lessig [22], p. 553, further elaborated that in-
stitutional corruption exists ‘[…] when there is a systemic
and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to
achieve its purpose […].’ Currently, a lively discussion
about the ‘ultimate’ definition of institutional corruption is
ongoing [21, 23–25] and so far has resulted in a range of
definitional approaches. Marks [26], p. 11, however, noted
that a broader perspective regarding institutional corrup-
tion may be useful because ‘[…] one definition works
better in some contexts and not so well in others.’ For this
contribution, a symbiosis of Thompson’s and Lessig’s defi-
nitions of institutional corruption is used as we see institu-
tional corruption as a situation in which the institutional
design produces incentives for those who perform the
duties within the institution that create conflicts of
interest and subsequently promote behavior that sys-
temically and strategically influences the institution’s
effectiveness by diverting it from its purposes.
Systemic dependencies and informal practices in
health care that have the potential to distort a health
care system’s societal mission through institutional cor-
ruption have only occasionally been investigated in the
relevant literature. Most studies have focused on the
pharmaceutical industry [27–30] and clinical research
[31–33], as well as medical care provision in general
[34–37]. Rodwin [27] highlighted the influence of the
pharmaceutical industry on medical research, publica-
tions and key stakeholders. Gagnon [28] problematized
the misalignment of the pharmaceutical industry’s finan-
cial interests with the purposes of the health care
system, which allows institutional corruption to breed,
while Light et al. [29] provided evidence that, during the
last decades, pharmaceutical firms have mainly developed
minor-variation new drugs instead of investing in clinically
superior new drugs following several systemic de-
pendencies, such as inadequate monitoring by and
commercialization of the Food and Drug Administration.
Whitaker and Cosgrove [30] investigated the influence of
the pharmaceutical industry on the American Psychiatry
Association. Wilmshurst [31] emphasized the key role of
medical schools and universities in setting standards for
clinical research, and Redman [32] drew attention to the
research ethics in biomedical research. Emanuel and
Steiner [33] investigated institutional conflicts of interest
and potential remedies in the context of clinical research.
Ensor [34] analyzed ‘endemic’ corruption in the form of
informal payments for health care services in transition
economies. Informal payments coincide – at least to a cer-
tain extent – with institutional corruption, as they are ‘[…]
part of daily life to the point at which it is no longer
considered illegitimate’ [34], p. 244. García-Prado and
González [35] examined the consequences of dual practice
for health care in terms of access, efficiency and quality
because the complexity of the financial incentives and the
possible conflicts of interest are likely to increase when
physicians work at the same time in the public and the
private sectors. They concluded that a statement on the
net effects of dual practice is difficult to make as a result
of the limited empirical evidence on these issues. Socha
and Bech [36] predominantly found arguments supporting
the negative effects of dual practice, among which were an
increased focus on and effort in private practice at the
expense of public health care provision resulting from the
higher income in private practice, an increase in public
waiting lists to stimulate the demand for equivalent
private services, the redirection of profitable patients
from public waiting lists to private practice, the over-
provision of health services in the public sector to ob-
tain a good reputation for treating patients in the
private sector and the use of public resources for
privately offered medical services. In relation to dual
practice, Ferrinho et al. [37] identified financial and
other barriers to access to health services resulting
from the predatory behavior of clinicians who generate
additional demand for their own privately offered ser-
vices, the absenteeism of clinicians in public institu-
tions due to the competition for time, the emergence
of (financial) conflicts of interest, which are supposed
to result in poor quality of publicly provided services,
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the outflow of public resources for providing services
in private practice and the corruption in the health
care sector.
While combating individual corruption, that is, illegal
individual behavior, has a long history in health care (see,
e.g., [34, 38–40], the analysis of institutional corruption
has only recently become the focus of scientific research.
As reasons for the neglect of institutional corruption,
Thompson [24], p. 19, listed the following: 1) institutional
corruption is closely related to conduct, which is part of
the job, 2) there is a common perception that no solution
to this problem exists, 3) there is predominantly a concen-
tration on personal misconduct rather than institutional
failures on the part of the public and the media and 4)
individual corruption still dominates.
The current analysis is intended to contribute to the
examination of institutional corruption in the health
sector by investigating whether the Austrian health care
system is prone to institutional corruption. In particular,
we analyze whether the current payment mechanism of
remunerating salaried public hospital physicians sep-
arately for treating supplementary-insured patients in
public hospitals, in combination with public hospital
physicians’ possibility of taking up dual practice as
self-employed physician with private practice and/or
as attending physician in private hospitals, provides a
systemic and strategic influence that undermines the
health care system by diverting it from its purposes
[23]. Following the theory of institutional corruption,
we first identify the primary purposes of the Austrian
public health care system. Next, we scrutinize the in-
stitutional design regarding special fees and dual prac-
tice in the public hospital sector to identify provisions
that potentially promote behavior on the part of the
public hospital physician that may systematically under-
mine the primary purposes of the Austrian public health
care system.
The research question is motivated as follows. Special
fees are an important source of income for public
hospital physicians; they are legitimate but may intro-
duce (financial) conflicts of interest on the part of public
hospital physicians, so there may be a substantial risk
that their financial interests will weaken the ability to
achieve the ascribed purposes of the Austrian health
care system. The diversion from the primary purpose(s)
of the health care system may even be aggravated by the
public hospital physician’s opportunity to take up dual
practice as a self-employed physician with private prac-
tice and/or as attending physician in private hospitals as
a result of the possible conflicts of interest the physician
may face when providing services in different settings in
which different remuneration systems are likely.
We focus on special fees in combination with the
above-mentioned dual practice options, because we
suspect several adverse effects on health care expenditure
and patient care (e.g. two-tier medicine and/or inefficiency
in service provision), which are the final result of a failure
of the institutional design rather than individual miscon-
duct. Undoubtedly, many more manifestations of corrupt
behavior, such as bribery, procurement corruption, im-
proper marketing relations, misuse of high level positions,
undue reimbursement claims and fraud and embezzle-
ment [38] – whether in the form of individual corruption,
institutional corruption or a combination of the two – are
worth analyzing. Covering all potential manifestations of
corrupt behavior, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper. Given a loss to corruption estimated to range be-
tween €1.1 and €3.6 billion in Austria [41], the identifica-
tion of potential gateways to corruption, however, should
be a priority issue.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 the characteristics of the Austrian public
hospital sector and the institutional design approach of
Oliveira [42], which has been chosen to investigate poten-
tial gateways to institutional corruption in the Austrian
health care system, are presented. The primary purposes,
institutional design and potential gateways to institutional
corruption resulting from the payment of special fees to
public hospital physicians in combination with the above
mentioned dual practice options in Austria are introduced
and discussed in Section 3. The paper concludes with a
short summary, discusses the shortcomings and provides
prospects for future research.
Methods
The Austrian public hospital sector
The Austrian health care system is based on the princi-
ples of solidarity, universal, equal and low-threshold
access to health services, high quality and efficiency in
service delivery [43]. The legally specified responsibilities
for the health sector are split between the federal gov-
ernment, the state governments and the statutory health
insurance (SHI) funds: while the federal government is
responsible for the framework legislation, the implemen-
tation and enforcement of regulations are the responsi-
bility of the state governments, which are also in charge
of the relevant hospital sector. The self-governing SHI
funds have been delegated the competencies for health
care services provided outside hospitals. The split of
competencies has resulted in a highly fragmented, com-
plex and partly opaque health care system with regard to
the delivery and financing of health services.
The Austrian hospital population can be classified ac-
cording to different (partly overlapping) structural features,
such as the care sector (acute, non-acute), care type
(general, specialized), care level (standard, extended, max-
imum, specialized), hospital type (general, specialized), type
of financing (DRG-based, not DRG-based), legal status
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(with/without public law status), benefit status (not-for-
profit, for-profit) and ownership type (public, private). Ac-
cording to the Austrian Federal Hospitals Act (KAKuG),
the legal status is decisive for the distinction between public
and private hospitals: Public hospitals are general and
specialized acute care hospitals and nursing facilities for
chronically ill patients which are granted public law status.
Public law status, which requires the hospital, among
others, to be run on a not-for-profit basis (irrespective of
the type of ownership), imposes additional obligations (e.g.
to charge only officially fixed tariffs) on the hospital in
exchange for additional rights (e.g. the right to subsidies in
the case of deficits) [44]. In 2017 113 hospitals (41% of all
hospitals) operated under public law status, providing
around 67% of the overall hospital bed capacity. Of these
113 public hospitals, 105 hospitals were acute care hospitals
which were eligible for public financing through state
health funds. The state health funds allocate a more or less
fixed budget, which mainly comprises predefined percent-
ages of sales taxes and valorized contributions of SHI funds,
on a DRG basis. The remaining eight hospitals were not
DRG-financed facilities for the chronically ill (mainly
financed out of SHI). Of the 161 private hospitals, i.e.
of the hospitals without public law status, 40 hospitals
were non-profit hospitals (comprising DRG-funded
and not DRG-funded facilities) and 121 hospitals were
for-profit hospitals [45]. Private, for-profit hospitals
(private hospitals henceforth) also receive public funds
(mainly SHI contributions) through a private hospitals’
fund for services provided to socially insured patients that
are covered by the SHI scheme.
Public (and private non-profit) hospitals may be autho-
rized through state legislation to run a special class in
addition to the general class and to approve further fees,
so-called special fees, for the treatment in the special class
[46]. The special class is supposed to cover increased pa-
tient demands regarding accommodation (one- or two-bed
room) and food as well as free choice of the employed pub-
lic hospital physician (mostly senior doctors or department
heads). Each of the nine Austrian states has made use of
the right to authorize a special class in public hospitals and
to approve additional charges in the form of special fees.
The special fees are usually covered through private
hospital cost insurance (also termed supplementary
health insurance, as medical care as such is publicly
funded, irrespective of whether it is provided in the
general or the special class). In 2015 around 36% of
the Austrian population had taken out some form of
supplementary health insurance. Approximately 56%
of these supplementary-insured Austrians were covered
through private hospital cost insurance [47]. In 2014 the
expenditures of supplementary health insurance on
hospitals amounted to 7% of the public expenditure
on hospitals [48].
Operating a special class in public hospitals has fre-
quently been justified as follows. Salaries in the public
health care sector are perceived as low. Special fees, which
comprise – among others – a hospital and a physician fee,
are supposed to ensure the commitment of highly quali-
fied medical staff to the public sector [49]. This ‘one-size-
fits-all’ justification, however, is problematic, because the
share of special fees and therefore the compensating effect
regarding the salary vary considerably across hospitals,
disciplines and qualification levels [50].
Public hospital services are supplied by health profes-
sionals, ranging from hospital physicians to nurses and
to lab assistants. Except for university hospitals, which
carry out research and teaching tasks in addition to pro-
viding public health services and in which employees of
medical universities also provide public services, hospital
physicians are employed by the respective hospital owner,
which is in most cases a hospital company owned by the
state or the municipality (public ownership) or a religious
order (private ownership). Public hospital physicians
receive a salary and an additional variable income,
comprising, among others, special fees for the treat-
ment of supplementary-insured patients in the special
class. A study in 2014 revealed the following average
shares of the yearly income of a public hospital phys-
ician: basic salary (42%), allowances, such as length-
of-service or hardship allowance (12%), overtime com-
pensation (17%), outpatient fees (8%) and physician
fees (21%). The actual shares, however, may differ con-
siderably, depending – among others – on the age and
the medical field of the physician [50].
Public hospital physicians may be authorized by their
employer to perform dual practice as a self-employed
physician with a private practice and/or as an attending
physician in private hospitals. The type and extent of
dual practice of employed hospital physicians may vary
considerably across states, hospitals and hospital physi-
cians, depending, among others, on how dual practice is
regulated. The dual practice of employees of medical
universities, for example, is regulated by federal law (the
Civil Servants Act (BDG)) or collective and operating
agreements, while the dual practice of employees of pri-
vately owned public hospitals is regulated in the respective
employment contract.
Supplementary-insured patients have several options
to consult a senior public hospital physician: directly in
his/her private practice (if additionally self-employed),
indirectly via the outpatient department of the public
hospital, directly in the private hospital (if he/she is also
an attending physician) or indirectly through referral by
another physician. The fact that public hospital physi-
cians are allowed to offer medical services in different
settings, in which they are most likely to be remunerated
differently, may have an impact on medical decisions in
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terms of the volume, range, frequency and timing of
medical services. It can also affect the setting in which
specific services are offered.
Rarely available state-specific data regarding the in-
come of chief public hospital physicians have revealed
that the size of the special fees is considerable (Table 1)
and even increases over time. Average income data have
shown the considerable size of chief hospital physicians’
financial gain from special fees, as they are able to in-
crease their income by more than double. The system of
special fees may therefore introduce considerable con-
flicts of interest, as hospital physicians are ‘rewarded’
for treating supplementary-insured patients. As public
hospitals benefit from special fees as well, strategic
alliances may emerge.
The institutional design approach
Oliveira [42] suggested a stepwise procedure (Fig. 1) to
investigate institutional corruption. In the first step, the
units under analysis have to be determined. Next, the as-
cribed purposes of these units need to be identified. The
constituent elements of an institution are frequently
described in terms of vision or mission statements, while
implementation is frequently asserted through bylaws
and strategy plans. These implementation issues are ad-
dressed in the third step, which analyzes the institutional
design in terms of the breakdown and motivation struc-
ture. This step follows a typical procedure in practice in
which regular reviews of implementation strategies take
place to identify any intentional or unintentional devi-
ation from the primary purposes. These review practices
are important, because they help to disclose whether
groups (e.g. staff categories) within or outside the insti-
tution (e.g. lobbies) are pursuing goals other than the
primary purposes without disclosing their behavior to
the primary target group of the institution. The assess-
ment of actually achieved or presumably resulting goals,
given the institutional design, is the subject of the fourth
step. If there is a discrepancy between the ascribed pur-
poses and the actually achieved or presumably resulting
goals, statements can be made regarding the existence of
(gateways to) institutional corruption. The approach
proposed by Oliveira therefore illustrates that, apart
from identifying institutional corruption, it is important
to be able to trace how, that is, through which channels,
institutional corruption has developed, and whether it is
the result of inappropriate rule making, probably influ-
enced by external advisory bodies, or rule-gaming deci-
sions by-passing the existing rules [51].
In our case the focus lies on public hospitals and
public hospital physicians in particular. It has to be
considered, however, that these service providers are
embedded within a hierarchical legal system, in which
the ascribed purposes of public hospitals are defined
at the level of the constitutional law. The framework
legislation, that is, federal laws, may also outline mis-
sion statements, which are tantamount to primary
purposes. The institutional design in terms of the
breakdown and motivation structure at the public
hospital level is heavily defined by state laws and regula-
tions, because the states are responsible for hospital care.
The states are therefore supposed to implement the
primary purposes outlined in the framework legisla-
tion at the federal level in appropriate goals at the
state and, thus, public hospital level. If the institutional
design promotes behavior that actually or presumably
leads to a deviation from the primary purposes, institu-
tional corruption and potential gateways to institutional
corruption are identified.
The evaluation of outcomes, however, can be based on
various approaches. First, if relevant data are available,
an empirical analysis of them is obvious to assess the
actual outcome. Alternatively, relevant knowledge from
the scientific literature can be used to draw conclusions
on possible outcomes in light of the breakdown and mo-
tivation structure. The latter approach is chosen for this
contribution due to a lack of access to relevant data and
missing data for Austria.
Results and discussion
Units of analysis, primary purposes and institutional
design
The examination of the Austrian health care system for
institutional corruption started in the first step with the
definition of the units of analysis, which comprise public
acute care hospitals (public hospitals henceforth) as de-
fined in section 2.a and public hospital physicians. Since
there are differences regarding the design of the regula-
tions concerning the special fees across the nine states
and the presentation of the nine state laws is beyond the
scope of this paper, the provisions for a single state
(Styria) are outlined representatively.
Table 1 Average income components
State Year Average gross income in thousand € (deflated to 1994 prices)
Salary Special fee
Styria [63] 1994 75.7 61.7
Styria [59] 2003 91.9 (79.2) 91.4 (78.7)
Upper Austria [50] 2014 104.0 (71.5) 156.0 (107.2)
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As regards the Austrian hospital sector, we identified as
primary purposes the goals for the overall health care
system outlined in the preambles of Austrian laws and
related resolutions. The preamble of the 15a Agreement
‘Health Care Organization and Financing’ outlines that
the parties (i.e. the federal and the state governments)
commit themselves to comprehensive medical care for all
people, regardless of age and income, based on the princi-
ples of solidarity, equal access to health services and high
quality and efficiency in service delivery [43]. In 2011 the
Federal Health Commission and the Austrian Council of
Ministers initiated the formulation of overall health targets
for Austria. Finally, 10 health targets, which mainly aim to
increase the years of healthy life instead of only
responding to illnesses, were officially approved following
a target-setting process involving all the relevant stake-
holders. Targets 2 and 10 are directly related to the major
principles of the Austrian health policy as outlined in the
15a Agreement ‘Health Care Organization and Financing’:
target 2 is to promote fair and equal opportunities in
health, irrespective of gender, socio-economic group,
ethnic origin and age, and target 10 aims to secure sus-
tainable and efficient health care services of high quality
for all [52]. In its preamble the 15a Agreement ‘Target
Control Health’ [53] emphasizes the focus on these guiding
principles for the Austrian health policy and public health
principles. Based on these laws and the resolution regarding
the Austrian health targets, we identified ‘good health,’
‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ as the primary purposes of the
Austrian health care system, and we assume that they
are also valid for the service providers who operate
within the public health care system. ‘Good health’ is
a typically intrinsic goal, while ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’
are instrumental goals, meaning that, if achieved, they
prepare the way for achieving ‘good health.’
These universal statements need to be translated into
explicit directives so that they can be used as a baseline
for service providers. We therefore first examined the
concrete formulations at the federal level that set up the
framework for the respective provisions regarding the
special fees at the state level. Table 2 summarizes the
provisions of the federal and state laws, regulations and
treaties that put the primary purposes into explicit
terms, that are considered potentially to exert an impact
(positively or negatively) on one or more of the primary
purposes and that are, to a certain extent, related to the
issue of special fees. Assignments to primary purposes
are made in accordance with what we considered to be
the main purpose(s) of the relevant provision.
Regarding the purpose of ‘good health’, public hospitals
have to admit anyone in need of medical care, have to
treat a patient as long as medically necessary and have
to decide on the medical treatment based on medical
grounds solely. Some of these provisions can also be re-
lated to the purpose of ‘equity,’ particularly the funda-
mental principles that no one in need of care must be
rejected and no discrimination must be made according
to the insurance status of the patient. ‘Efficiency’ is of
considerable importance, because compliance with effi-
ciency secures the financial stability of the health care
system. Efficiency-related provisions are found in the
15a Agreement ‘Target Control Health,’ which emphasizes
the importance of treatment at the best point of service,
that is, cost-effective and efficient service provision that
guarantees high-quality medical and nursing care at the
right time and in the right place, the importance of
coordination between different service providers, the
relief of the cost-intensive Austrian inpatient sector
and the development of remuneration systems that
are compatible with the Austrian health targets.
For certain provisions, however, it is a priori unclear
whether a positive or a negative effect on the primary
purposes dominates. These include, inter alia, the pro-
hibition of extra payments of hospital staff, which per se
promotes equity and efficiency efforts. As the respective
provision excludes special fees and separate fees (§46),
which chief university physicians may require in addition
to the possibility of charging special fees pursuant to
§§16 and 27 (4) of the KAKuG, the primary purposes of
equity and efficiency may be undermined considerably.
Similar arguments are valid for the restriction of the
number of special-class beds to 25% of the overall bed
capacity: on the one hand, special-class beds cannot be
increased arbitrarily; on the other hand, a 25% limit may
increase the overall bed capacity or hinder the capacity-
reducing efforts. With regard to the implementation of
the special class in general, a positive effect in terms of
generating additional revenue is prevalent; a negative ef-
fect is expected from additionally remunerating hospital
Fig. 1 Operationalizing institutional corruption
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physicians for providing medical care in the special class,
which, in turn, must not be different from the medical
care provided in the general class.
The legal provisions, which regulate the hospital and
the physician fees of the state-owned public hospitals
in Styria (and which provide about 91% of the public
hospital bed capacity in Styria [45]) are complex and
outlined in Table 3. Public hospitals are allowed to run
a special class if there is a sufficient (absolute) number
of beds in the general class. If accommodation in the
special class is requested, hospital and physician fees
apply. The hospital fee is levied to compensate for the
extra costs for material and personnel in the special
class and is made up of different compensation sys-
tems, ranging from a percentage of the relevant DRG
fee to flat fees. The hospital owner retains the entire
hospital fee. Although there shall not be any difference
in medical treatment between the general class and
the special class, a physician fee applies if the patient
requests medical treatment in the special class. As dif-
ferences in medical care are prohibited by law, there
has been a lively discussion in the scientific literature
what exactly the supplementary-insured patient re-
ceives in return for the physician fee [54]. Both the
hospital and the physicians benefit from the physician
fee. The public hospital currently receives a hospital
share totaling 19%, while the physicians involved in
the treatment of special-class patients receive the
remaining 81% (physician share). The physician share
is then divided between the affiliated physicians. The
allocation procedure, which is governed by regulation
and, thus, obligatory for the employees of the public
Table 2 Directives outlined in federal and state laws
Federal laws Good
health
Equity Efficiency State laws, regulations and treaties
15a Agreement ‘Target Control Health’ State treaty ‘Target Control Health’ [64]
Art. 5 (1–2) Provision of medical care at the ‘best point of service’ + Definition of public service obligations
for all care levels (primary, hospital
outpatient and inpatient care) and
launching implementation
Art. 5 (2–3) Coordination of services across all sectors, offering of
patient-oriented and needs-based services and prevention or
reduction of parallel structures
+ + + Development of interdisciplinary forms
of care in the ambulatory setting
Art. 5 (3–2) Relief of the inpatient sector in hospitals through
medically and economically justified relocation of services to
day care and ambulatory care
+ +
Art. 5 (3–7) Development of remuneration schemes, which
guarantee service provision at the best point of service
+ Participation at the federal level in
developing incentives to promote
outpatient care
Federal Hospitals Act (KAKuG) Styrian Hospitals Act (StKAG)
§16 Non-profit hospitals must §51 adopts §16 KAKuG
• admit everyone in need of medical care in accordance with
the hospital’s facilities
+ +
• accommodate every patient as long as medically required + + +
• ensure that medical treatment, irrespective of accommodation
in the special class, is based on the medical condition of the
patient solely […]
+ + +
• secure that the staff, notwithstanding §27 (4) and §46 (1), must
not be remunerated by patients or their family members
+/− +/−
• not run more than 25% of the total beds as special-class beds +/− +/−
§22 (2): Public hospitals are obliged to admit any socially insured
patients
+ + §87 (1) adopts §22 (2) KAKuG
§27 (4-1) State legislation has to determine
• whether and +/− +/− §66 regulates the prerequisites for
implementation of the special class
• what further charges may be levied in the special class +/− +/− §75 regulates special fees
§46 (1) The department heads of university hospitals may agree
a separate fee with special-class patients […], irrespective of the
special-class patients’ obligations to pay special fees […], if these
patients request treatment by the department head. This separate
fee is not subject to §27 (4) […].
+/− +/−
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state-owned hospitals, follows a complex scoring
method that takes the hierarchical position, seniority
and special qualifications of the physicians into ac-
count [55].
The breakdown and motivation structure with regard to
the special class provides financial incentives for hospitals
and hospital physicians to treat special-class patients. The
question therefore arises of whether the service providers
have the opportunity to boost their income through spe-
cial fees, that is, whether hospital physicians can influence
the demand for treatment in the special class. The wide-
spread possibility of dual practice for (senior) hospital
physicians paves the way to influencing the demand re-
garding elective services.
Usually, dual practice requires authorization from the
employer and is limited in time. Regarding dual practice,
there may be differences depending on the type of owner-
ship across public hospitals: while privately owned hospitals
usually regulate dual practice options individually under
employment contracts (non-competition clause), the dual
practice of physicians of the state-owned public hospitals
(and the medical university) is subject to two different
sources of law in Styria, the Civil Servants Act (BDG) and
the Styrian Civil Servants and Pay Act (Stmk L-DBR). The
BDG outlines that dual practice is any activity pursued out-
side employment and must not be performed if it hinders
the physician from fulfilling his official duties, causes the
presumption of partiality or endangers other essen-
tial interests of the service. The civil servant (i.e. the
hospital physician) is obliged to notify the employer
about any dual practice. The Stmk L-DBR adopts
these provisions and further states that the employed
physician may pursue a medical activity in another
hospital or may use hospital equipment and staff
only if authorized by the employer. These regulations
offer the opportunity to perform dual practice and,
therefore, to influence the demand in the settings in
which physicians operate.
Gateways to institutional corruption
Rodwin [2], p. 10, pointed out in quite an early study
that self-employed physicians are entrepreneurs just like
any other freelancers, meaning that they sell services to
generate income, while the employment of physicians
typically precludes entrepreneurship. The institutional
setting in the Austrian hospital sector, however, opens
up a broad spectrum of opportunities for physicians
employed in public hospitals to act in an entrepreneurial
manner. Public hospital physicians can influence their
overall income by pushing their variable income compo-
nents, such as the physician fee for the treatment in the
special class of the public hospital, and the income resulting
from authorized dual practice as self-employed physician
and/or as attending physician in private hospitals.
The employed public hospital physician can proactively
influence the occupancy of the special class through the
referral of supplementary-insured patients from outpatient
to inpatient care, because hospital and physician fees are
restricted to inpatient services. This may be attractive
whenever there is void capacity in the special class. This
activity can boost physician income but may impede any
attempts to relieve the inpatient sector because any
Table 3 Regulations regarding special fees in Styria
Special fees (StKAG)
Public hospitals may run a special class in addition to the general class […] if the hospital provides a sufficient number of beds in the general class,
particularly for those who cannot be denied hospital care. […] There shall not be any difference in medical care. The special class has to meet higher
demands in terms of food and accommodation. (§66)
Special fees comprise the hospital fee, the physician fee and the midwife fee in the special class and the outpatient fee.a (§76)
Outpatient care and financing Inpatient care and financing
Lump-sum compensation (socially insured)
Special fees (self-payers only)
DRG/case fees (general class; socially insured)
DRG/case fees and special fees (special class;
supplementary-insured)
Special fees comprise [65]
Hospital fee Physician fee
− compensation for extra costs (material,
personnel) in the special class
− tariffication predominantly based on flat
fees and fees as a percentage of the
DRG fees
− compensation for medical care provided
by the department head and affiliated
physicians in the special class
− tariffication predominantly based on specific
fees (for surgical interventions, diagnostic
imaging, radiotherapy treatments), fee/day
(conservative treatments), surcharges and flat








aMidwife and outpatient fees are no longer considered
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reduction of the total bed capacity is tantamount to in-
come loss for both the hospital owner and the hospital
physician because the special-class bed capacity is linked
to total bed capacity (25% rule). In addition, the tariffica-
tion of hospital and physician fees reveals that pay per
intervention and pay per day are predominantly used to
remunerate hospitals and hospital physicians for providing
special-class services. Following the findings of relevant
scientific studies [6, 8–10, 13, 16], these payment forms
are likely to increase the volume and range of services.
The restriction of hospital and physician fees to inpatient
care and their tariffication are likely to threaten any at-
tempts to provide services effectively and efficiently at the
best point of service.
If any of the dual practice options outlined above is
performed in addition to the employment in a public
hospital, we assume that the extra work is pursued to in-
crease the public hospital physician’s income. Although
dual practice may lead to considerably adverse effects
[36, 37] the institutional design of the Austrian public
hospital sector permits different types of dual practice.
As a consequence, intricate structures evolve regarding
the flow of funds and patients and the activity that
hospital physicians may undertake in the context of
physician fees (Fig. 2).
A public hospital physician may be authorized to pursue
dual practice as a non-contracted physician or – in rare
cases – even as a contracted physician with a private prac-
tice. If a patient attends a contracted physician, the
services provided are directly settled with the SHI fund
(mostly on a FFS basis) that individually contracts with
the respective physician. The SHI funds directly regulate
the number of contracted physicians through the number
of contracts offered. Patients may also attend a non-
contracted physician directly. In that case they have to pay
in advance and receive reimbursement to the amount of
80% of the tariff that the SHI fund would have paid for
this service to a contracted physician. The SHI funds have
no opportunity to regulate the supply with non-
contracted physicians directly. In the context of special
fees, the dual practice as a (non-)contracted physician
with a private practice opens up the possibility not only of
acquiring income in the form of physician fees through
(self-) referral from private practice to the special class in
the public hospital but also of acquiring additional income
as a self-employed physician through, for example, reverse
referral from the special class to private practice for
medical aftercare. In Vienna, for example, referral from
private practice to the special class is rewarded through
‘bringer solutions’ [56]; that is, hospital physicians are fi-
nancially better off (in terms of the physician share) when
they refer patients from private practice to the special
class. While this may impede attempts to relieve the
inpatient sector, proponents of this solution argue that it
strengthens the competitiveness of the public hospital
sector if the patient would otherwise have been admitted
to a private hospital. This argument, however, presumes
that there is no physician-induced demand and that
inpatient care is the ‘best point’ for service provision.
Empirical evidence on this issue is lacking in Austria.
A potential approach to investigating this question
could be to undertake, for a selection of comparable
diagnoses, a comparison of the referral behavior of
hospital physicians who run a private practice with
Fig. 2 Interplay between hospital physicians’ activities in the presence of physician fees and dual practice
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that of contracted and non-contracted self-employed
physicians without any affiliation to a hospital. This
issue, however, is challenging due to the different ac-
counting systems that apply to contracted and non-
contracted physicians and the different accounting
systems between the 19 SHI funds.
The analysis of the referral behavior can also be used to
investigate whether the current institutional design system-
atically promotes a two-tier medical system: the differences
in the waiting times, access, range and volume of services
between socially and supplementary-insured patients, ad-
justed for diagnosis and age, would indicate that the current
institutional design promotes behavior that undermines the
system’s equity purpose. Differences in waiting times for
elective treatments between socially and supplementary-in-
sured inpatients, however, have already been disclosed
[57]. Another study revealed a higher number of lab
tests and a greater frequency of express lab tests for
supplementary-insured patients [58]. Further sparse
empirical evidence regarding the impact of supple-
mentary health insurance on ‘good health,’ ‘equity’ and
‘efficiency’ is available through the Audit Court Re-
ports, but the results are mainly snapshots, particu-
larly as the findings are mostly by-products of audit
assignments, the aim of which differs from the current
research question. One Audit Court Report [59] re-
vealed differences in the average LOS between socially
and supplementary-insured inpatients in university
hospitals in 2004 (Vienna +1.6 days, Graz +1.8 days
and Innsbruck +1.5 days in the case of supplementary
health insurance), which mainly occurred in orthopedic
and vascular surgery departments. In 2008 the Vienna
Audit Court investigated differences in assignments of
elective surgeries between socially and supplementary-
insured patients in the departments of orthopedics and
ophthalmology, in which differences were found regarding
the registration for and planning of elective surgeries [60].
Public hospital physicians may also be authorized to
provide medical services as attending physicians in
private hospitals. Dual practice in private hospitals is
sometimes handled more restrictively (e.g. conditional
on the explicit patient wish [61]), because dual prac-
tice in private hospitals competes directly with public
hospitals. If dual practice as an attending physician in
private hospitals is authorized and the hospital phys-
ician decides to treat a patient in the private hospital,
financial resources (the hospital fee and the hospital
share) are withdrawn from the public hospital. As only
public hospitals are obliged to admit socially insured
patients, private hospitals have a decisive strategic ad-
vantage, as they may cherry pick financially attractive
patients, which, in turn, may be mirrored in the amount
of remuneration that the public hospital physician receives
for providing services as an attending physician in the
private hospital. In the case of dual practice in private
hospitals, reciprocal referral between the private and the
public hospital may occur, probably depending on the
severity of the illness (usually, the more severe the more
appropriate the public hospital so that more complex and
more expensive services then have to be provided in the
public hospital) and the financial consequences for the
hospital physician of treating patients in either of the two
hospitals. The complexity of the referral behavior further
increases if the public hospital physician works as a self-
employed physician in private practice in addition to dual
practice in private hospitals. Another Audit Court Report
revealed that 3700 of the 32,300 employees of the Vienna
Hospital Association (the main owner of public hospitals
in Vienna), that is, around 11.5%, had indicated that they
had engaged in dual practice in 2006. With regard to the
165 medical directors and department heads, 148, that is,
89.7%, performed dual practice [62]. Such activities may
seriously impair attempts to coordinate services efficiently
and effectively in all sectors and to prevent parallel struc-
tures. Further negative effects, such as increases in public
waiting lists, may result from the potential absenteeism of
department heads in public hospitals as a consequence of
providing services in private hospitals as outlined in the
relevant literature [37]. Previous reports have revealed that
chief physicians had the opportunity to perform services
outside the hospital starting in the early afternoon due to
highly flexible work time regulation and a lack of trans-
parency regarding timekeeping [61, 62].
Summing up, the analysis of the institutional design of
the public hospital sector with regard to special-fee pay-
ment and dual practice, in combination with the knowledge
from the relevant scientific literature and the sparsely avail-
able Austrian-specific studies, has revealed that there are
several gateways to institutional corruption in Austria.
Table 4 summarizes potential conduct as a result of legal
regulations that has the potential to put the achievement of
the purposes of ‘good health,’ ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ at risk.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether the
Austrian health care system is prone to institutional cor-
ruption and, if so, through which channels institutional
corruption has developed. Institutional corruption may
arise as a consequence of the emergence of (financial)
conflicts of interest that result from the institutional
design and that enforce the tension between physicians’
fiduciary task of acting in the best interests of the patient
and their financial interests. Medical decisions that are
made in favor of physicians’ financial benefit usually do
not harm patients directly, as their effects are rather
indirect: inefficient resource use as a consequence of
supplier-induced demand (concerning the volume, range
and frequency of services), inequity as a consequence of
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a two-tier medicine system (concerning the range,
timing and continuity of and access to medical ser-
vices) and, subsequently, impairment of the popula-
tion’s good health if the financial viability of the
overall health care system suffers and equal access for
equal needs cannot be guaranteed.
The paper focused on special fees in the form of phys-
ician fees, because they represent an important source of
additional income for employed public hospital physi-
cians. Physician fees are paid for treating supplementary-
insured patients in the special class of public hospitals.
The impact of dual practice was also taken into consider-
ation, because dual practice as self-employed physician or
attending physician in private hospitals opens up a broad
spectrum of opportunities for employed hospital physi-
cians to act in an entrepreneurial manner, which, in turn,
is supposed to interact with the service provision provided
in the special class of the public hospital.
The institutional design, which regulates special fees
and dual practice in the public hospital sector in Austria,
has grown historically in an attempt to contribute to the
financing of the public health sector and to commit
highly qualified physicians to the public hospital sector.
The rule-making resulted in extremely complex and
further proliferating amendments to the respective regu-
lations. The institutional design, however, has been put
into place without clearly and comprehensively addressing
and assessing the overall consequences for the purposes of
the health care system as can be seen by the potential
gateways to institutional corruption which have been
identified for a single Austrian state. The results showed
that there are in fact legal provisions and directives, which
have the potential to promote behavior on the part of the
employed public hospital physician that systematically un-
dermines the achievement of the Austrian public health
system’s primary purposes of ‘good health,’ ‘equity’ and
‘efficiency.’ This corresponds to the definition of ‘institu-
tional corruption’ in the relevant literature. In particular,
linking the additional income of public hospital physicians
in terms of physician fees to inpatient capacity utilization
and paying fees per intervention and/or day bears the risk
of inefficient service provision as a result of potential
supplier-induced demand and overprovision of services.
Restricting the payment of special fees to inpatient care
and authorizing dual practice, especially in private
hospitals, puts at risk the service provision at the best
point of service and the relief of the cost-intensive
inpatient sector. Paying physician fees to employed
hospital physicians at all may lead to two-tier medi-
cine in the form of prioritizing the supplementary-
insured patients and/or increasing or by-passing pub-
lic waiting lists. Following some rare Austria-specific
studies and general findings in the relevant scientific
literature, the emergence and existence, respectively,
of two-tier medicine seem likely.
While the prevailing contribution identified only poten-
tial gateways to institutional corruption following the lack
of access to empirical data and missing data, future
Table 4 Potential gateways to institutional corruption
Breakdown/motivation structure
according to federal/state laws
potentially promotes puts at risk
• Existence of a physician fee per se prioritization of supplementary- insured patients,
increasing/by-passing public waiting lists
equal treatment for equal needs in
terms of volume, range, timing and
access
• Restriction of hospital and physician
fees to inpatient (day) care
inpatient care of outpatient (ambulatory) care service provision at the ‘best point of
service’ and relief of the inpatient
sector
• Limiting the special-class bed capacity
to 25% of the overall bed capacity
high capacity utilization reasonable reduction in the overall
bed capacity and capacity-reducing
innovations
• Tariffication of physician fees overprovision of medical services, prolongation
of length of stay
equal and efficient service provision
• Possibility of dual practice redirection of profitable patients to private
practice/private hospital
service provision at the ‘best point of
service,’ coordinated service provision,
prevention and decrease of parallel
structures and relief of the inpatient
sector
overprovision of medical services through
self-referral
focus on private practice at the expense of
public health care provision
misuse of public resources for privately offered
medical services
absenteeism
outflow of public hospitals’ resources to private
hospitals
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research needs to concentrate on the actual effects on the
medical decisions of public hospital physicians caused by
the conflicts of interest resulting from the institutional
design regulating physician fees and dual practice. The
hypotheses, which were derived on the basis of the rarely
available data for Austria and the general findings in the
relevant literature, clearly need to be tested empirically. In
other words, a reliable and accessible database covering
relevant information regarding, for example, the revenues/
income from special fees at the hospital and the physician
level, and across medical disciplines, the type and extent
of dual practice of public hospital physicians, the service
provision in terms of the volume, range and timing of
services inside and outside the hospital, the referral and
timing of referrals and the waiting times for medical treat-
ment, each disaggregated by the insurance status of the
patient, is required to assess reliably the actual effects of
the current institutional design on the ascribed purposes
of the Austrian public health care system.
Empirical evidence regarding the actual effects is a pre-
requisite for the development of reform proposals in terms
of conflict regulation, should the hypotheses regarding in-
stitutional corruption prove to be true. If there is still com-
mitment to the current primary purposes of ‘good health,’
‘equity’ and ‘efficiency,’ possible options for reform range
from reshaping the payment system of public hospital
physicians towards higher salaries as compensation for
variable income components (physician fees) to chan-
ging the tariffication and/or allocation of physician
fees and to reregulating the options regarding the dual
practice of employed public hospital physicians, par-
ticularly in private hospitals. It might, however, also
become necessary to reregulate the service provision
of self-employed physicians and the organization of SHI:
starting points range from revising the organization and
financing of primary health care to overthinking the over-
all number of contracts offered in the present system and
to uniting the SHI funds (or even all the social security
funds) to avoid differences in the accounting systems and
in the benefits and contributions between the socially in-
sured. If, however, there is no longer commitment to the
purposes of ‘good health,’ ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ or the
purposes can no longer be maintained, further options
may emerge. Final considerations and recommendations
can only be made if the nature and extent of the alleged
negative effects of physician fees and dual practice on the
primary purposes of the Austrian health care system are
determined comprehensively.
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